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ABSTRACT
The intersection of body and state is a fascinating phenomenon of modern-day politics. We
are continuously subjected to the ingeniousness with which the ruling classes monitor and
regulate our bodies; and most times we are not even aware of it. Whether it is for control
over resources or political power and authority, the state uses its institutions and various
tools available to it for the purpose of maintaining disciplined, uniform populations that
could otherwise threaten prevailing power structures. In particular, the patriarchy has
perpetuated the notion that a woman’s body is a specific threat to those prevailing power
structures. This thesis engages with states’ use of their legal institutions to subjugate
women by controlling their bodies. To demonstrate, the thesis draws on the case of Iran in
1979, when the fall of one power structure led to the rise of another, and the control of
revolutionary bodies that could potentially challenge the newly established status-quo
became imperative to the state. The thesis takes the hijab law as a chief example to examine
the ways in which the Iranian regime touched the bodies of its female subjects following
the revolutionary moment in 1979, in order to consolidate its power and ensure methods of
perpetuating that touch well into the present day. Against this backdrop of stringent
biopolitical agendas, Iranian women continue to draw strength and solidarity in the lived
experiences of everyday women, forming a resistance to inspire feminist movements
everywhere.
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I.

Introduction

It is the 8th of March, 2018. In an overcrowded women’s compartment in the Tehran
metro, three women are standing shoulder to shoulder taking up the width of the metro
aisle. Three scarves, wrapped around three necks, carrying three uncovered heads. In the
immediate background, a young woman stands looking at the ground; she is wearing a
scarf on her head that is pushed so far back you can see almost all her hair. The young
woman almost immediately looks out the corner of her eyes, and as though instinctively,
upon noticing the camera, nervously turns her back. One of the three women in the
foreground speaks to the other two quietly. With near orchestral precision, the three
women hold hands and break out into chant-like song. They are singing a Farsi song
called “I’m A Women,” and though the words sound foreign to non-Persian ears, the
passion with which they enunciate each word transcends semantics. Two of the three
women are carrying black and white photos showing an iconic image of the Women’s
March on the same day 39 years earlier: the 8th of March, 1979.
The city is Qom, where Ayatullah Khomeini, the Iranian Republic’s new leader,
resided. Thousands of women are marching through streets, fists pumping in the air.
Against a backdrop of barren winter trees, the crowds stretch far and wide. In the
distance, men create human chains to surround the marching women from occasional
anti-protest mobs trying to infiltrate the marches. 150 kilometers away, in Tehran,
thousands upon thousands more women are marching, too, and they continue to do so for
six days. It is barely two weeks after the revolution that brought about the downfall of the
Shah, and brought Khomeini back to Iran and into power and the chanting has returned to
the streets. “We didn't have a revolution to go backwards.”1 These are the chants shaking
Tehran’s buildings and the mosque walls of the religious city of Qom. The words come
out with a sense of urgency and regret; the same women who were marching a few weeks
earlier for the overthrow of the Shah, sparking the events that lead to Khomeini taking

Masih Mohammadi, “ “[ ”تظاهرات زنان ايراني بر ضد حجابWomen’s demonstration in Tehran”], YouTube
(March 18, 2011), available at https://youtu.be/VTqnRLxxhXo.
1

1

rule and the establishment of the Islamic Republic, were now grappling to
reinstate their presence in a moment in history. It had become clear, in those early postrevolution days, that there would be no room for revolutionary women in the Islamic
Republic of Iran.
It is September, 2016. A mother and daughter are cycling through the island of
Kish, off the southern coast of Iran, with wind in their faces and a sense of mutually
agreed resolve in their pedaling. “It’s our absolute right, and we are not going to give
up,” says the daughter, looking straight into the camera. 2 A day earlier, the Supreme
Leader had issued a statement that women were to be prohibited from riding bikes in
public.
In the 1990s, a live performance in Tehran’s Vahdat Hall takes place. Inside, the
harmonious culmination of instruments and vocals sweep the audience up into a melodic
trance. At first glance, it might seem like a musical scene anywhere in the world, but in
reality, it is a concert in Iran, where the voice of a woman has been deemed by
conservative clerics to have the ability to trigger arousal and female singing solos are
deemed taboo. To maneuver the situation; the Iranian music scene developed a technique
called co-singing (“hams-khani”,)3 whereby female vocals are sung alongside one or two
other male vocals. It is within these grey-zones and through these loopholes that the show
goes on.
On the 8th of March 2018, an image goes viral. Standing straight under the arched
branches of an ancient looking tree, on top of a utilities metal box in the middle of an
overpacked sidewalk, is a girl carrying a stick. On the end of the stick, a white fabric
hangs limply in the wind. Boldly contrasting with the white of the fabric, is the girl’s
striking black hair hanging loose over her left shoulder. With flickers of her black hair
blowing over her head, almost as if to tantalize the white cloth hanging at the end of the
stick, Vida Movahed stands above a sea of men, many of whom are glancing up at her
with expressions of confusion and awe.

2

Andree Massiah UGC & Social News team, Women in Iran defy fatwa by riding bikes in public, BBC
NEWS, (21 September 2016), available at https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-37430493.
3
Yara Elmjouie, Alone again, naturally: women singing in Iran, THE GUARDIAN, (29 August 2014),
available at https://www.theguardian.com/world/iran-blog/2014/aug/29/women-singing-islamic-republiciran.
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And so, these scenes continue to reenact themselves, time and time again. In Iran,
a vibrant history of women’s resistance and struggle reincarnates itself in every Women’s
Day on the 8th of March, and every few years in grand gestures that take social media by
storm, but also in the mundane, day-to-day actions of solidarity and defiance against a
backdrop of an oppressive state that attempts to silence, cover and immobilize women.
Iranian women find themselves in situations where making choices about how their
bodies sound, or how their bodies transport, or how their bodies dress, have become the
greatest form of dissent against the state. But how did that come to be?
The female body in Iran, much like everywhere else in the world (especially in
post-colonial contexts) was a site of political struggle throughout its history. In this
thesis, I attempt to capture a particular moment in Iranian history which I believe was a
formative one for Iran’s feminist movements and has continued to reproduce women’s
resistance since: the 1979 revolution. In the midst of revolution and political upheaval,
there was an almost immediate, though not unique, obsession with what and how women
appear in the public and the newly established regime wasted no time in regulating
women’s bodies in society. This is the moment that interests me; the moment in which
the Islamic Republic of Iran, in its earliest stages of state-building, first engaged with the
politics of touch.
My first introduction to the politics of touch was in the wake of Egypt’s own
revolution in 2011. I had learned for the first time what it meant for the state to practice
its capacity to control the very bodies of its subjects in March of that year, when the
Supreme Council of Armed Forces had detained protesters from Tahrir Square a few
weeks after Mubarak had been ousted. The female detainees at the time were subjected to
virginity tests conducted by a military doctor. I later understood this as a biopolitical act
of gendered violence performed by the state to subjugate revolutionary forces, and to
declare its authority over both the literal and figurative bodies within its domain. A
moment of the state explicitly “touching” the female body. In his account of the Egyptian
feminist movement and the history of the Egyptian state’s experience with sexualized
securitization, Paul Amar explains how the focus on female sexuality arises in moment of
protests and to delegitimize political opposition. He writes, “women who protested were
sexualized and had their respectability wiped out, not just by innuendo and accusation,

3

but literally, by being sexually assaulted in public and getting arrested for prostitution,
being registered in court records and press accounts as sex criminals, and then getting
raped and sexually tortured in jail.”4 By doing so, the state creates both a theoretical as
well as juridical association between the female protestor, and the prostitute, or the
sexually deviant woman. This consequently, as Amar explains, renders the figure of a
respectable female protestor impossible. 5 It is with this understanding of why a state
would be interested in controlling bodies, that I attempt to capture the Iranian regime’s
actions in the early days following the 1979 revolution.
In order to make sense of the way in which the state “touches” bodies, I first
illustrate what I am referring to by this “state” that touches. To do so, I draw on
Foucault’s theories. He says:
I don’t want to say that the State isn’t important; what I want to say is that
relations of power, and hence the analysis that must be made of them, necessarily
extend beyond the limits of the State.... [T]he state can only operate on the basis
of other, already existing power relations. The State is superstructural in relation
to a whole series of power networks that invest the body, sexuality, the family,
kinship, knowledge, technology and so forth.6
Indeed, I find that the public institutions that make up modern day power
structures, allow the state to impact female populations in a particular way that intends on
disciplining their bodies. In his theory of sovereignty and state power, Foucault describes
that power is exercised in modern day societies through the combination of a state’s right
to sovereignty and via various mechanics of discipline.7 His theories on the state and the
means with which it perpetuates its disciplinary methods could be summarized in the
following description:
The discourse of discipline is alien to that of the law; it is alien to the discourse
that makes rules a product of the will of the sovereign. The discourse of
disciplines is about a
rule: not a juridical rule derived from sovereignty, but a discourse about a natural
rule, or in other words a norm.

4

PAUL AMAR, HUMAN-SECURITY STATES, SEXUALITY POLITICS, AND THE END OF NEOLIBERALISM, 213,
(Duke University Press, 2013).
5
Id.
6
MICHEL FOUCAULT, POWER: THE ESSENTIAL WORKS OF MICHEL FOUCAULT 1954-1984, Truth and Power
122, (Penguin UK, 2019).
7
MICHEL FOUCAULT, “SOCIETY MUST BE DEFENDED” LECTURES AT THE COLLÈGE DE FRANCE, 1975-76,
37-38, (2003), https://pdflibrary.files.wordpress.com/2008/02/foucault_soc_defended.pdf
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He later builds on this to theorize the final stage of “government” which aims to “perfect”
and “intensify” the processes of power it directs. 8 To do so, the state no longer depends
on the law, rather, its tactics are streamlined through processes that ensure the continued
subjugation of its population. However, Foucault also emphasizes in his later works the
fact that, governmentality is threefold whereby it engages in a continuous process of
sovereignty, discipline and government. He writes:
We need to see things not in terms of the replacement of a society of sovereignty
by a disciplinary society and the subsequent replacement of a disciplinary society
by a society of government; in reality one has a triangle, sovereignty-disciplinegovernment, which has as its primary target the population and as its essential
mechanism the apparatuses of security. 9
Iran’s 1979 revolutionary moment is particularly interesting as a moment in time
when in many ways a new sovereign was being established. By looking at the events and
the regime’s actions in the early moments of its conception, the “triangle” in its three
points can clearly be seen at work. For my thesis, I am particularly interested in the point
where law is used as a disciplinary measure for the control of the female population in
Iran and I believe this intersection of law and the female body can be vividly seen in the
1979 revolutionary moment. I am interested specifically in how law is invoked to control
women’s bodies during times of revolution and resistance. Women are entrapped by
intentionally shaped laws stipulating what those bodies should look like and how those
bodies should act, in an effort to turn those laws (which fall under the “disciplining”
power of the state) into socially constructed ideas that organically lead to the submission
of those very bodies (which in turn leads to disciplinary societies, that eventually lead to
control societies, as described by Deleuze. 10) In this thesis, I draw upon the specific case
of the hijab law (used to monitor women’s dress and public appearance, and thus,
eventually, silence their dissenting voices in protection of the state’s existing power
structures) as an embodiment of that intersection of different power structures and forms
of state governance.

8

MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE FOUCAULT EFFECT: STUDIES IN GOVERNMENTALITY, Governmentality 95, (The
University of Chicago Press, 1991).
9
Id.at 102.
10
Gilles Deleuze, Postscript on the societies of control, 59., THE MIT PRESS, 3, 3-7 (1992).
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The 1979 Iranian revolution is a case in point that shows us the ways in which
states use the law in revolutionary times. For the purpose of my thesis, I view the
revolutionary moment to be a moment in which Foucauldian notions of disciplinary
tactics as enacted by the state are most visible. The state uses different modes of control
to exert, and consolidate, its power over women’s bodies particularly in the fragile
moments of state-building; from navigating their access to public spaces, to directing
their access to education and the labor market, to navigating their familial relations. To
demonstrate how this is done, I look at the hijab law as an embodiment of the Iranian
regime’s utilization of the law in regulating the relationship between its female citizens
and the state, the public (civil society) and their own bodies (in their private lives.)
A starting point for my thesis is based on the premise that the state has the desire
to and is capable of, exerting control onto its subjects in an effort to consolidate its
power. While I do draw on Foucault’s concept of power which is centered on the
rejection of the concept that the state is a unitary center of power, rather, that power is
exercised through multiple forces, institutions and discourses, I do not believe that the
state has at all withered away. Aretxaga’s theory of the state succinctly describes my
understanding of the state for the purpose of this thesis, as follows:
The state as phenomenological reality is produced through discourses
and practices of power, produced in local encounters at the everyday
level, and produced through the discourses of public culture, rituals of
mourning and celebration, and encounters with bureaucracies,
monuments, organization of space, etc.. 11
In 1979 in Iran, for example, the state’s social and political presence, which in
Aretxaga’s words “can hardly be ignored” 12, became particularly vivid. In a moment of
rupture, when a new form of state was coming into being, the state’s power in creating
systems of control was visible.
Even more specifically, I attempt to engage with the state by looking at a
particular site in which the state’s power is reproduced: the female bodies it governs.
Aretxaga writes that “at the margins of the polity and at the local level, encounters with
the state are often experienced in an intimate way where power is experienced close to

11
12

Begoña Aretxaga, Maddening States, 23., ANNU. REV. ANTHROPOL,398, 393-410, (2003).
Id. at 393
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the skin, embodied in well-known local officials, through practices of everyday life (Das
2003.)”13 In the early days of state-building in 1979, out of which today’s Iran was born,
these intimate ways of exercising power were clear as day. Such was the case for the
entire population, indeed, but it was particularly experienced by the female population.
Aretxaga echoes this notion of disproportionate control over women’s bodies when he
writes that “women have become the embodiment of a threatening nation or a threatening
ethnic other; their bodies become the field through which violent statehood not only
enacts but draws its power.”14
And so, it is on these premises that I engage with the Iranian state as it was being
established in 1979, in order to encapsulate the ways in which it touched the bodies of
Iranian women, and to understand how that served its power dynamics. In specific, I look
into the law as one of the sites in which those power dynamics are illustrated with the
understanding that “the terrifying force of the management of bodies and people that
characterizes the modern state, coupled with the intimacies that invest it, is not unrelated
to the power of the law as it has come to represent the sovereign power of the state.”15
In chapter one, I study the years leading up to the 1979 revolution, focusing on
the dominant discourse on women, and gender more broadly. I am interested in
unpacking the logic of state control and subjugation by engaging with this history.
Specifically, I focus on how Iranian women’s bodies became sites of political and legal
contestation. In other words, this chapter sets up the scene for the 1979 revolution as a
moment to think about the politics of touch (by the state) in revolutionary times. Chapter
one also serves as an important premise on which my thesis is based. There are various
reasons why I chose Iran as a case study but possibly the most important reason is
because of its versatile history with regards to the political nature of its many state forms.
Before being an Islamic Republic, Iran was governed by Western-oriented, secular
modernists and by portraying the ways in which the female body has been a site of
contestation throughout Iranian history, long before the Islamic Republic came to be, I
attempt to shed light on the fact that power structures desire the control of women’s

13

Id. at 398
Id. at 398.
15
Id. at 404.
14
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bodies. The state will, and does, always exercise its power over women’s bodies, whether
the form of government is secular or Islamic; how this power manifests itself onto
women’s bodies will be different, but, in essence, “there is a strange intimacy between
the state and the people. The state excises from the polis those subjects and practices that
question or threaten homogeneous models of territorial sovereignty and heterosexual
forms of political control, which are fundamental to national narratives of harmonious
domesticity.”16
Chapter two is about the revolutionary moment itself. Here, I am interested in
looking at how the state’s tactile practices formed the Islamic Republic’s image of an
Iranian female subject. Again, context is important to the understanding of the intentions
of the regime in stipulating laws that maneuver the presence of female bodies in Iranian
society at a fragile moment of state-building. In particular, I take a closer look at the
hijab law as a manifestation of the reach of law in moments of change. I examine the
hijab law and the legal bodies that regulate it, to observe the socio-political impact it has
had on the lived experiences of Iranian women.
In chapter three, I look into the afterlives of the 1979 moment that remains
palpable 41 years later. Iranian women show us the essence of resistance in their ability
to navigate the law (case in point being the hijab law) and its supporting institutions of
violence that are so vehemently intent on confining them to fabric and reducing them to
fragments of the nation’s “honor.” I explore the ways in which Iranian women resist the
state’s touch on their bodies and suggest that feminist movements everywhere take a page
out of their books: in Iran the everyday lived experience of women becomes an act of
resistance in and of itself. The resistance of women in Iran tells a story of how the Iranian
state project of creating a society of control has failed. Its disciplinary practices failed too
often, and thus it continuous to attempt to reinvent levels of controlling women’s bodies
through the law.
In making a final note I would like to say this: as a Muslim woman with a
particular resentment for the effects of neocolonial “othering” on people of the Global
South, I am not interested in joining forces with white feminists wanting to save brown
women from their own communities. On the contrary, I chose the hijab law, for example,
16

Id.at 403.
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as an illustration of the legal tools used by states to turn women’s bodies into playing
fields for the advancement of their socio-political agendas. In other words, this is not a
contestation of the hijab as such. I am not interested in joining forces with liberal voices,
either. The intention in selecting Iran as a case study is not to condemn Islamic
governance. On the contrary, it is to critique state power in all its forms. As the story in
Iran has showed us, the state manages women’s bodies, seen as a “threatening nation,” 17
regardless of the ruling ideology. In doing so, I hope to complicate the relationship
between the state, public law and gender, and to challenge the role of law during
revolutionary times in confining and constraining revolutionary subjects, especially
women.

17

Id. at 398.
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II. The Politics of Body
The 1979 revolution in Iran is a revolution of profound social change, of anti-imperial
triumph, of grappling with modernity and resisting Empire. It is a revolution creating
Islamic governance that paved the way to a theocracy like never seen before, and, most
memorably, it is a revolution heavy with gender struggle and sexual politics that have
structured Iranian state and society to this very day. Iran’s revolutionary moment of 1979
left irreversible marks on the bodies of those in its streets and homes. Those bodies,
which had been created long before on the streets, in the classrooms and at the Bazaars,
collectively assembled together regardless of class, background or political ideology in
the moments leading up to the revolution. They rallied behind hope for an authentic
nation state that was true to the Iranian heart. In the way that the history of modern states
has come to show, however, this moment of unity would soon pave the way for a new
Iranian regime, which would then itself pave the way for new systems of oppression,
dividing and conquering the revolutionary collective into separate bodies that can be
controlled and neutralized.
Throughout this chapter, I explore the ways in which Iranian women, simply by
being, posed the “woman’s question” in various moments of political upheaval in Iran’s
history as a modern state. By doing so, I illustrate a more vivid image of the female body
in Iran leading up to the 1979 revolution, in order to later depict how that female body
became, in turn, a site of struggle during the revolutionary moment of 1979, and beyond.
In the years leading up to 1979, many factions of Iranian society created the
waves that would eventually cause the collapse of the Pahlavi regime and with it, the
Iranian monarchy. For starters, there were the Bazaaris, a category of Iranian citizens
who were “involved with petty trade, production, and banking of a largely traditional to
only a slightly modernized nature,”18 and whose activities were centering on bazaar areas
and traditional Islamic culture. 19 The Bazaaris were in close association with the ulama 20

18

NIKKI R. KEDDIE, MODERN IRAN: ROOTS AND RESULTS OF REVOLUTION, 226, (Yale University Press,
2006).
19
Id.
20
Traditional Muslim religious scholars, who have historically had large social and political influence in
Iran.
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and the Iranian clerics; who, benefitting from the traditional legitimacy of the
clergy and deep social network embedded in Iranian society, were essentially the
mobilizing force of the revolution. In addition to those two factions were the students,
who played a substantial role in taking to the streets, and the lawyers who assisted greatly
in the shaping and organization of protests and rallies. In every one of those factions,
Iranian women were present. As students, teachers, lawyers, Bazaaris, farmers and
workers, these women’s participation in the 1979 revolutionary movement was
substantial. Just as substantial as their participation in the revolution itself, was the way in
which the Iranian woman; her body as well as her presence in the public space, became a
subject of contestation during the revolutionary moment between competing and rising
powers in Iranian political life. The struggle between the different factions of the political
scene (nationalists, Islamists, modernists, etc.) was mirrored in their different approaches
to women. Even though the 1979 revolution in its own right was exceptional, it showed
how the female body is often a site of struggle in revolutionary moments, or moments of
profound political rupture.
Read through an understanding of Foucault, the body is a social construct, formed
by power relations and politicized in such a way as to serve political ends. The concept of
the political utilization of bodies to control populations is known as biopolitics, which
“deals with the population, with the population as a political problem, as a problem that is
at once scientific and political, as a biological problem and as power’s problem.” 21 This is
foundational to understanding the desire of the Iranian state to control its population,
specifically women’s bodies, the ways in which the state chose to do so during the
moment of political rupture in 1979, as well as the lasting impacts this has had on Iranian
women to this day.
I have come to understand that the individual does not come to be out of a void.
The man/woman is produced from various experiences; particularly the experience of
human connection. How humans connect in the social dictates how man and woman are
seen and understood. The same can be said with regards to how the state, despite its
abstract nature, interacts with its subjects, and how that defines those very subjects in
turn.
21

FOUCAULT, supra note 7 at 245.

In the next section, I complicate the understanding of what it meant to be an
Iranian woman by 1979; by understanding how the female body was “created” in the
Iranian context from the experiences of women with state and society prior to 1979, I
then build on that understanding to analyze how the 1979 experience impacted those very
female bodies. It is important to note here that there is no particular approach taken with
regards to the chronology of events in Iran. The following section unravels ways in which
the Iranian woman’s body became a political question in times of political upheaval or
change, from the Qajar period leading into the creation of “modern” Iran, to the Pahlavi
dynasty and the post-colonial moment of nationalism.

A. The Theoretical Evolution of the Iranian Woman
Afsaneh Najmabadi takes an in-depth look at who a woman in modern Iran is, by
dissecting Iran’s understanding of gender and sexuality and how it evolved over time.
Going back to the Qajar period, the Pahlavi dynasty predecessor, when Iran was ruled by
the Qajar dynasty from 1789 to 1925, Najmabadi illustrates the ways in which modernity
and the Empire restructured the Iranian understanding of gender and sexuality. Whereas
in Iranian tradition in the early Qajar years, gender was far more fluid a concept, with
female/male depictions often hardly distinguishable and the concept of love not
exclusively defined as heterosexual22, modern Iran saw the transformation of sexuality
and gender to mean more binary and strict depictions of male vis-a-vis female, and of the
shunning of homosexuality. This transformation, as argued by Najmabadi, came along
with Iran’s increased interaction with Europe. Brought on by the initiation into the
modern moment as imposed on Iran by the West, such a change is not unique to the
Iranian case in point. The colonial experience, in general, is defined by its “civilizing
mission,” through which the White Savior must liberate barbaric nations from their
backward practices. As Franz Fanon writes, “colonialism is not satisfied merely with
holding a people in its grip and emptying the native’s brain of all form and content. By a
kind of perverted logic, it turns to the past of the people, and distorts, disfigures and
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destroys it.”23 Experiences of the Global South with colonialism and the Western
imperial order, have had long standing impacts on not only the logic and knowledge
creation of the communities that it has exploited, but also on the ways in which those
communities function, with the perception and function of gender being largely impacted,
too.
Najmabadi goes on to describe the historical process through which the female
body and the male body came to be seen in modern Iran in relation to nationalism. She
uncovers how national symbolism coincided with the reconfiguration of the female and
the male in Iran, thus defining gender roles and women’s status in society. Women
slowly came to be seen as the fertile bearers of children. She explains how “once vatan
was embodied as a mother, woman's body was also transfigured. Dedicated sons would
emerge from the homeland's pure soil, the nation's originary womb. A woman's womb
would exude vataniyat (patriotism) and produce a new kind of Iranian.” 24 Soon, the
homeland was seen as the “mother,” and inherently female, while the state became
increasingly masculine and “the modern state [seen] as a male collective in charge of
protecting the female homeland became progressively more masculinized symbolically as
well.”25 This masculinization process was completed with the crowning of Riza Shah
who had centralized and consolidated power to become the head of the nation, or its
father. For insight on the context in which the concept of the Iranian woman was
manifested, I attempted to depict the way in which gender had intertwined with the
history of Iran, and it naturally flows that next, I will outline how the Iranian woman was
impacted throughout the evolution of Iranian society into modern Iran. This way, I
attempt to draw an image of the various ideological and political struggles that have, time
and time again, dictated the experience of the Iranian woman in Iran, eventually leading
up to the Iranian revolution.
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B. Post-Colonialism and The Woman Question: A Nationalist
Struggle
Adding to the way the Iranian woman was seen and defined was Iran’s experience with
post-colonialism and the wave of the modernization mission engulfing non-Western
nations. The country’s post-colonial moment coincided with critical developments in
gender and sexuality in various colonized states. The modernization project of Iran in the
nineteenth century, as based on the European model, had lasting effects on the woman
question in Iran. From providing a new focus on women’s education to shifting the way
societal norms for women, such as the veil, were seen, the Iranian example once again
shows one how nationalist fear juxtaposed with the will to modernize creates a current
that sweeps over women in society. In Iran, this changed not just how the female was
seen in the figurative sense, but also how she was seen in the very literal sense of the
word, namely in her dressing and undressing. Najambadi illustrates this battle between
political forces and its impact on how women were allowed to appear in public:
For Iranian modernists, viewing European women as educated and cultured, the
veil became a symbol of backwardness. Its removal, in their view, was essential to
the advancement of Iran and its dissociation from Arab-Islamic culture. For the
counter-modernists who wanted to uphold the Islamic social and gender roles, the
European woman became a scapegoat and a symbol of corruption, immorality,
Westernization, and feminization of power. 26
The veil, and what a woman wears thus became a matter of national identity: did
Iran want to position itself as modern? Westernized? Forward-looking? Or did it want to
appear traditional? Authentic? Backwards? How would it choose to present itself? And in
what ways would that choice result in the formulation of the female identity?
Questions like these, centered around women in the post-colonial moment, were
not exclusive to Iran, but rather common for other neighboring nations transitioning from
colonialism to their independence at the time, as was the case in India and Egypt27, for
26
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example. In those contexts, the “women’s question” was raised precisely at the time
when Europeans arrived at the shores of the Global South and the dichotomies between
East and West, modern and traditional, and woman then and woman now were born.
This is how the “modern” Iranian woman came to be. A woman who went from
belonging only to the private sphere, to becoming a “newly conceived woman, with a
veiled language, a disciplined body, and scientific sensibilities, [who] could claim a place
in the public space; she could be imagined as a citizen, learning a new verbal language, a
new language of the body, and new rules of social intercourse…” 28 In Najmabadi’s
words, the Iranian woman became “the well-educated mother, the companionate wife, the
capable professional woman often at the service of the state institutions, the sacrificing
nationalist heroine, the selfless comrade.”29
It was this woman for whom the veil was compulsorily banned by law in 1936
with the kashf-al-hijab decree as imposed by Reza Shah Pahlavi. The female body was
thus subjected to, as Walter Mignolo suggests of the lived experiences of colonial
subjects, “a constant struggle between forces of regulations and energies of liberation,”30
It is therefore inevitable that by defining the female as one thing, she is juxtaposed
discourse, “nineteenth-century Egypt saw the rise of the modern state, expanding capitalism and fuller
incorporation into the European-dominated world market system, secularization, technological innovation,
and urbanization. These forces, changing the lives of Egyptians across lines of class and gender, assailed
urban harem culture.” Though Badran essentially argues that the Egyptian feminist movement came to be
and found a voice independent of the West, the temporal fact remains that the shift in understanding gender
and the woman in society coincided with increased European interaction and presence in the region, as it
did in Iran. In India, the “women’s question,” as referred to by PARTHA CHATTERJEE in Colonialism,
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was strongly defined by the colonial moment. In this case, the nationalist movement, in an effort to
overthrow the colonizer, determined the answers to the “women’s question.” In the Indian experience, the
change in women’s status and role in society came, not as a direct result of colonialism, but rather as a
resistance mechanism to Western impact. The Indian experience of nationalism was defined by the
meticulous process of selecting what belongs to the “material world” and thus ought to be Westernized and
what belongs to the “spiritual world,” wherein the East was more superior than the West, and thus should
remain intact. The role and status of women in India were areas that belonged to both domains and thus
saw an interesting new structure emerge. The new woman defined in this way was subjected to a new
patriarchy. In fact, the social order connecting the home and the world in which nationalists placed the new
woman was contrasted not only with that of modern Western society; it was explicitly distinguished from
the patriarchy of indigenous tradition, the same tradition that had been put on the dock by colonial
interrogators. Sure enough, nationalism adopted several elements from tradition as marks of its native
cultural identity, but this was now a "classicized" tradition-reformed, re- constructed, fortified against
charges of barbarism and irrationality.
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against another; there is the image of the woman and the counter-image. The Iranian
female body, despite having become reincarnated into a newly-founded role, “could not
do away with her complementary/conflicting Other: the sexual woman, seething with
appetites and desires, previously held in check by the veil.”31 She remained a symbol of
political narratives. As explained by Najmabadi, “by the I960s and 1970s she becomes
the very embodiment of Westoxication, often referred to in the anti-Shah oppositional
political discourses, both secular and Islamist, as the "painted doll of the Pahlavi regime."
In this reinscription she embodies a double Other: the enemy within, fitna, and the enemy
without, the West, thereby making it possible for the previously distinct voices of secular
radical modernism and the newly rearticulated Islamism to condemn in unison the
"superwesternized" woman.” 32 33

C. The Modern Iranian Female Subject: On the Eve of
Revolution
With this understanding of who the woman in Iranian society was, one can begin to
understand her experience interacting with state and society in the time before the Islamic
Republic. As illustrated, the Iranian woman enjoyed increased visibility by the turn of the
nineteenth century. She became “sister” and “citizen.” The early 1900s saw increased
public appearances of women and demands made for the advancement of women’s
rights. Records of the first Majles34 meetings from as early as 1908 show debates with
regards to the legality of women’s appearances in public as seen at the time through
women’s associations, which would plan social events as well as fundraising events for
women’s schools and celebrations of national occasions.35 Quite literally, this period
witnessed the beginning of the visibility of women in Iranian streets through the debates
in Majles about this new visibility’s legality. Later, women’s political presence became
palpable on the streets of Iran during the constitutional revolution. From as early as 1905,
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when several men and women were paid by a prominent family of landowners to protest
the overtake of land by a Russian bank, 36 to 1906 during increased tensions between
government and religious officials, whereby an account is given of crowds of women
stopping the Shah’s carriage in protest of rumors of certain ulama being held against their
will to negotiate with government officials, 37 women became more politically active.
Questions of women’s education also increasingly appeared on the public stage
during the legal reforms and drafting of the constitution, in 1906. Journalists had a large
role to play in informing public discourse on the issues being discussed by the ulama as
well as the revolutionaries and intelligentsia in the Iranian Majles. They began discussing
the importance of education for women reflecting the discussions occurring in parliament
at the time. These discussions and urban political activism paved way to more changes
later on in the 1900s, with the new Pahlavi dynasty.
However, even the desire to advance education for women was underlined by
ulterior motifs. On one hand, calls for female education were perpetuated by the turn of
the century to coincide, as explained previously, with the modernity project and increased
Westernization. To fit into the Western mold, the education of women needed to happen
through formal channels that were producing knowledge mirroring the West. On the
other hand, calls for female education were made with underlying concepts of producing
a particular type of female subject; by justifying the need for women’s education on the
basis of the female’s role as the supportive wife, and nurturing mother, who must be
equipped with particular knowledge in order to become desirable for marriage and to
manage her household efficiently. 38
Through the discourse used in promoting education, the Iranian woman was thus
further defined: woman as wife, mother and creator of citizens. Najmabadi describes the
rationale behind this promotion of education at the time, and its contribution to furthering
the limitation of the female figure in Iranian discourse: “Women's education was
therefore oriented toward rearing an educated (male) citizenry…Once the family was
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envisaged as the building block of the nation, relationships within it had to be
reformulated. Ignorant women made unsuitable mothers and unfit spouses."39
This is an indication of how the state underwent the process of creating an educated
female subject, and how that was, in and of itself, a gendered process from the start, to
consolidate the woman as a particular socio-political subject.
Looking at the labor force of a specific society at a certain point in time reveals
much about the overall societal patterns in which the labor force is functioning. In an
interesting survey of women’s labor in Iranian history, Valentine M. Moghadam provides
an extensive look into the history, regarding which academics and historians have mostly
remained silent, of female labor in the Iranian market. She states that “accounts of Iranian
economic history show that Iranian women played an important economic role in the late
Qajar period, in ways that benefited the family/household, owners of enterprises, and the
state.”40
At the particular moment of Iran’s transition into capitalism, women in Iran were
involved in productive labor ranging from work in the textile industry. Whether this work
was in carpet weaving or in manufacturing velvet, Moghadam interestingly notes that “in
1906-07, some 3,000 workshops producing velvet (makhmal bafi) could be found in
people's homes, almost entirely operated by women.”41 Further, records indicate that
unproductive labor at the time was also performed by, in the literal sense of the word, the
female body, whereby prostitution and sex work were “alternately tolerated, encouraged,
and punished”42 during the Qajar dynasty. Additionally, though Moghadam writes that
“we know very little about poor urban women, the difficult lives of maids and wet nurses,
or the marital experiences of urban or rural women,” 43 we can understand from her
analysis that women were responsible for other forms of unpaid reproductive labor,
including housework and nursing.
Despite the fact that the historical records of women’s labor indicate that women
workers were grossly underpaid and subjected to difficult working conditions, be it in the
39
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factory spaces or in the very fact that they would have to perform their own waged labor
to assist their husband’s earning in addition to “unpaid” labor in the household, thus
combining productive and reproductive labor,44 it is understood that women in the Qajar
era, and stretching into the Pahlavi dynasty, had various roles in the labor market. A
study by S. Kaveh Mirani shows the ratio of women to total persons employed in major
industries by 1978: agriculture (4.3%), to manufacturing/mining (an alarming 33.1%), to
construction (0.4%, which might not seem high in abstract terms, but when considering
the nature of construction work, is a remarkable figure), energy and health (2.6%,) and
general services (21.4%), an interesting proportion of the total labor market in those
industries.45 Mirani credits these figures to not only the increase in the level of education
of women, but also the fact that general economic conditions in Iran had been rapidly
developing during the Pahlavi dynasty. Hamideh Sedghi explains these changes as well
by associating the rise in numbers of women in the labor market with the simultaneous
integration of Iran into world capitalism, which caused an increased demand in overall
labor, part of which was women’s labor.46
The very absorption of female bodies into the labor market was both a political
tactic as well as a result of political choices made by the last Shah at the time of his rule.
These policies again were ones implemented by the desire for Westernization and for the
approval of post-colonial powers. In Sedghi’s words, “What served Westernization-as he
understood it- served the monarch: even a degree of women’s emancipation and their
participation in the labor force.”47 To meet the increasing need for a developed economy
according to the new age of capitalism, women needed to be incorporated into the formal
economy, though the importance of their work in the household did not diminish. Rather,
a woman’s value in the labor market was measured against and justified by her ability to
balance between her duties as a “mother” and “wife” with her ability to assist in
providing for the family as well, which could explain how and why in Iran, the majority
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of women participating in the labor force in the 1970s were married women.48 The
female body, even in the moments when she had become increasingly visible in the labor
market, was still defined by her gendered role in society, and was still seen as an object to
address the Woman’s Question and the dilemma of modernity in an increasingly
capitalistic and post-colonial world. In this case, it had become a matter of how the
female body could be utilized in the labor market to advance the vision of westernization.
As Sedghi writes of the Shah’s strategies, “motivated by the drive to project a “modern”
image of the state, as well as of himself, to the West, the Shah declared that to meet part
of the demand for labor, ‘greater use must be made of the enormous existing pool of
women.’”49

D. Women and The Pahlavi Dynasty: One Step Forward, Two
Steps Back
As further indication of the fluid relationship between the female and the state in Iran, the
years of the final Iranian dynasty presented a paradoxical time of increased freedoms for
women under Reza Shah that were also met with increased limitations. While education
for women was central to all national programs in Iran, gaining significant grounds when
it became compulsory in 1944, and despite the establishment of a coalition of women’s
groups under the Women’s Organization of Iran in 1966 (an organization centralized
under the patronage of the Shah’s twin sister, no less, and again, reinstating the concept
of the contradiction of both advancement and limitation of women’s freedoms,) the
kashf-al-hijab law was applied in the 30s, banning the veil in public.
The veil ban in Iran coincided with the Shah’s modernity project, and was among
many provocative dress code regulations at the time. 50 The veil ban prohibited women
from wearing the veil and chador in public. The ban defined the experience of women in
public spaces at the time, whereby many women’s rights for mobility and movement
were repealed owing to cultural beliefs that they could not be present in public “with
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nothing on.”51 In an attempt to liberate the woman from the veil, the Shah had done the
opposite to the more conservative working classes of Iranian women. State violence was
used to ensure that women were uncovered: police would ban women from entering
particular areas if they were veiled, and even assaulted women physically when they
would tear scarves off them. 52 The parallels that are drawn between the kashf-al-hijab law
in the 30s, and the hijab law in the 80s, are fascinating. The two laws, though 50 years
apart and, theoretically, one being the precise opposite of the other (one law banning the
veil and the other enforcing it,) are in reality, exactly the same. Both laws sprout from the
same structures of state oppression and violence; both laws aim to turn bodies into
abiding subjects that are otherwise seen as a threat to the ruling class’s political agenda,
whatever it may be at any given time. The Iranian woman’s body was always a site of
subjugation over which many diverging actors (the state, the imperialists, the nationalists,
the anti-modernists, or the Islamists) contested.
While the limitations on the physical mobility of many women in public spaces
were increasing, so were, ironically, the advances of women in the political sphere. In the
1940s, the wave of nationalism hit Iran, and many nationalist and leftist party members
were women.53 By then, women were receiving formal education and participating
politically, both in urban movements as well as in formal political structures.
The White Revolution was also a defining moment in Iranian women’s history.
Beginning in 1962, the Shah enacted many modernization reforms varying from land
ownership, to reforms in infrastructure and women’s status. It is noteworthy that these
reforms and the start of the White Revolution coincided with increased American interest
in Iran and the Kennedy administration’s prioritization of Iranian relations, in an attempt
to secure Western support and thwart Soviet threats. April R. Summit, in a paper
discussing the Kennedy/Shah relations during the White Revolution, wrote: “In its report
in the fall of 1961, the Task Force on Iran argued: ‘to prevent Soviet domination of Iran
must be our immediate and overriding objective. This re- quires the continuance in power
of a pro-Western regime, for the ultimate alternative is a weak neutralist government
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which could not withstand Soviet pressures.’ The report suggested various methods the
US could use to preserve the stability of the Shah. One option was to take a very open
and active role in pushing for reforms, the other a more private, discreet one. Whatever
the method, Iran must be stable in order to contain the Soviet Union.”54
It becomes evident, then, that the reforms of the White Revolution, including
those targeted at the Iranian woman, were politically charged by Western forces to
advance agendas that far extend beyond the lives of the Iranian people; a notion
reminiscent of the impact of the colonial predecessors of the Western imperial epoch in
Iran.
Nevertheless, women’s lives continued to be defined both in the streets and in the
homes and in 1963 women were granted the right to vote and to run in elections for
certain public office positions. Further, a number of women had also been elected to the
Iranian Parliament. In relation to how the woman was defined in the private sphere, the
Family Protection Law, which provided changes to the Iranian civil code, was amended
during this time as well. Initially, section 1133 of the civil code provided the husband’s
autonomy in matters of divorce, but the Family Protection Act aimed to restrict divorce
and provide some form of increased equality between both husband and wife in matters
of divorce.55 Additionally, the Act, which was reflected into the civil code, discussed
child custody and the restriction, albeit not the prohibition, of polygamy. The civil code
at the time of its amendment allowed for increased emancipation for women, for example
in allowing women the right to independently control their own property and assets. 56
However, it was still underlined by several limitations in the ability of women to have
total control over all aspects of their lives. A case in point is article 1117, which
stipulated that: “The husband can prevent his wife from occupations or technical work
which is incompatible with the family interests or the dignity of himself or his wife.” 57
From these examples, it is clear, then, that the woman was used merely as a tool for
performative progressiveness; the freedoms granted to women in Iran during this era
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were precise political decisions and were almost always underlined or met with ways to
ensure that the complete emancipation of the Iranian woman would not and could not be
attained.
Throughout this chapter, I have described the evolution of the concept of “body”
in the years leading to the eve of the 1979 revolution; particularly that of the woman. I
have explained how, by the time the revolution in Iran had erupted, the Iranian woman
had already been established as the “honor” of the nation; a visible actor in the public
sphere, an educated and working laborer who must also remain a “mother” “sister” and
“wife.” She had already been dressed and undressed, emancipated and oppressed, and
had become an essential component for westernized modernity and the heart of
“Westoxication.”58 The female body and its visibility stood for far more than a mere
physical existence; it had long become political, and so had the symbols and indications
of that visibility. As Najmabadi writes, “the veil, in its hypervisibility, has come to serve
as a sign for more than gender; it has come to be read for "the state of modernity." This
hypervisibility has compounded the erasure of that other excess figure of Iranian
modernity by continuing the prior work of making woman stand as a privileged mark of
modernity.”59
With this illustration of the many times in which the Iranian woman was a site of
contestation over the years prior to 1979 and how state and society have defined the
female subject over time, it is easier to imagine how in the revolutionary moment of
1979, the Iranian woman was, once again, redefined and, quite literally, redressed by a
new system of power players to perpetuate new systems of oppression. It becomes clear
that the woman in Iran, as is the case elsewhere in the world where patriarchy has defined
and regulated our understandings of both public and private spaces, is a body that is itself
historically constructed and re-constructed by the state and power forces in order to fulfill
particular political end goals.
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III. The Body of Law
The act of categorizing opposition in particular moments of political upheaval by very
much literally touching the bodies of those politically adversarial individuals, is a
prominent feature in the Iranian state’s experience, but is not unique to it. As illustrated
in the first chapter, over the course of Iran’s modern history as well as in the experience
of other post-colonial states like India and Egypt, in moments of political rupture and
revolution, the “women question” was perpetually raised and contested, and with it,
women’s bodies were defined, redefined, and thus, to a large degree, disciplined (or
attempted to be disciplined.) In a way, this control of bodies, be it socially or
legislatively, can be interpreted as moments in which the state touches the bodies of its
subjects. The concept of touch understood politically may seem absurd; after all, “touch”
is associated with biology; with poetry and art, but hardly ever with politics and law.
How can the state, an abstract concept, “touch” the physical bodies of its subjects?
This chapter engages with one of the ways in which Iran has controlled its
population against revolution. Though this was achieved through several complex
methods, for the purpose of this thesis, I focus on the state “touching”, i.e., controlling
Iranian women’s very bodies using the law. I illustrate the context in which the veil law
was enacted and implemented. I look at the veil law as an example of the ways in which
the newly-established regime first touched the female body, in an attempt to unpack the
many layers that contributed in the subjugation of the Iranian woman. In order to do so, I
theoretically engage with revolutions and counter-revolutionary practices from a
gendered perspective; I argue that revolutions, and thus, counter-revolutions, are about
gender just as much as they are about economy, social welfare and anti-imperialism. As
Aretxaga writes:
On the one hand, the fantasy of a unified, imagined nationalist community clashes
with internal differences and power struggles. Differences class, gender,

24

ethnicity, and status create de facto differences in citizenship. The impact of state
power is felt differently at various levels of the national community. 60
As such, it is important to understand the Iranian woman’s narrative and her
experience in the 1979 Revolution. Further, I observe the symbolic value of the veil
itself, prior to state intervention, and the events leading up to the very moment in which
the state used the veil as a tool of subjugation. By doing so, the state turned its focus, in
terms of its general discourse as well as its legislation, onto the female body. I believe it
is important to point out here, that I do not mean to say that individual men behind closed
doors plotted for the subjugation of women in this way, rather, that the way in which the
events and legislative decisions were actualized led to state-sponsored control of Iranian
women’s bodies in a revolutionary moment which they had as much ownership of as their
male counterparts. Finally, I deconstruct the veil law to portray the ways in which it
manifests the state’s intention to subjugate women and female forces.

A. Can the State Touch?
When we talk about touch, we should not restrict our understanding only to fingers.
Rather, haptic experience concerns the whole body or the whole skin covering the body
(Montagu 1971). It is also a constant sensual account of our relationship with the world.
Through our haptic relationship with the world, we also make sense of it. Touch, as a
form of “dwelling on the surface of the body of the other” (Segal 2009, 6), has a
tremendous world-making capacity in marking surfaces with value and meaning,
establishing boundaries, and indicating borders. From this point of view, it connotes
something beyond merely the physical; it is a corporeal situation charged with
emotional, political, social, and cultural processes.
-Asli Zengin,61
As I grapple with coinciding the meaning of “touch” with state practices,
Zengin’s words strongly resonate with me. The way in which the state defines and
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redefines the woman through its social discourses and its juridical policies, thus
impacting the perception of the woman and her experience in interacting with state and
society, can very much be seen as acts of touch.
Touch is twofold. By this, I mean to say that touch involves both the “touched”
and the “toucher,” and it is essential that they both come into contact. From the previous
chapter, one can understand the ever-changing nature of the Iranian state’s illustration of
the female subject in moments when the state and Iranian women came into contact,
across different moments of political upheaval in its modern history. With that in mind, a
closer look can be taken into the particularly significant event that defined Iranian women
of today: the 1979 revolution. By understanding the nature of the contact between Iranian
women and the regime one can begin to understand the ways in which the state turned
that moment of contact into an opportunity to touch, encapsulate, and discipline female
citizens, in order to eventually quench political dissent, and how that opportunity to touch
define the experience of Iranian women with both state and society to this day.
As understood from the previous chapter, the question of women’s identities,
bodies and, specifically, how to dress them, is one that has long been raised throughout
Iran’s modern history. Every moment of political change had deep and physical
implications on women’s bodies; from the early Qajar period and the fluid approach to
gender and “bodies” in their physical and figurative sense, to the post-colonial moment
when unveiling women, in an attempt to emulate the West and embrace its ideals, was
regarded as a premise for modernization, to the moments of power struggles between
different ideologies and political actors in which questions of women’s education, labor
and legal rights were contested. Naturally, this means that the question of the veil did not
form out of a vacuum in 1979. As worn and interpreted by the Iranian woman, the veil, or
the chador, the name for traditional Persian and Islamic cloth covering the woman’s body
and face save for her eyes, had held a significant presence in the revolutionary moment in
Iran from its start.
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B. Woman and Revolution
Accounts of the early days of the revolution describe the noticeable presence of women
on the streets of Tehran. In their 1985 study on modes of mobilization in the Iranian
revolution, Ahmad Ashraf and Ali Banuazizi divided the revolution leading to the final
collapse of the Shah’s regime into three waves of protests, strikes and movements of
dissent they refer to as “revolutionary activities.” 62 They described that “with each
successive wave, the number of participants in revolutionary activities increased
dramatically. Beginning with 45,000 participants in the first wave, the number almost
quadrupled in the second, leaped to 1,400,000 in the third, rose to 5,200,000 in the fourth,
and finally involved some 29,000,000 people in the last.” 63 Though they do not include a
gendered perspective of their statistics, it can safely be assumed that these numbers were
not all only male revolutionaries. This understanding that revolutionaries distinctly
included female bodies is emphasized through Shahla Talebi’s description of her
experiences in Iranian prisons. As a former Iranian political prisoner, she was detained
both under the Shah’s regime, in 1977 as well as under the post-revolutionary Islamic
regime between 1983-1992. Through her riveting account in “Ghosts of Revolution,” 64 of
her own experience as a female political activist as well as those of her fellow women
inmates, the “gendered” layer of political participation of women in the years leading to,
and of, the political disruption culminating into the 1979 revolution becomes clear.
The Iranian revolution was a series of mass collective protests and strikes
mobilized by different groups and segments in society. Misagh Persa describes this
collective action in their book “Social Origins of the Iranian Revolution,” writing that “by
1977, the regimes policies had adversely affected major social groups and. Classes
including bazaaris 65, industrial workers, white-collar employees and professionals. The
mobilization and collective actions of these classes and their coalition were responsible
for the overthrow of the monarchy.”66 From the working class bazaaris and the white62
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collar workers, to the clergy, the legal professionals and the students, collective dissent
against the Shah and his regime was breaking out across the streets of Tehran, and then
echoed elsewhere into more rural areas.67 As illustrated in the first chapter, women in
Iran by 1979 had been present in each of those revolting factions, with perhaps the
exception of the clergy. Representing a segment of the bazaaris and the working class,
female workers were present in factories as well as involved in the labor market, albeit
many times being involved in unpaid labor. Female students were growing in numbers in
universities and school across the nation. In “Reconstructed Lives,” by Haleh
Esfandiari68, her primary sources of accounts of Iranian women on their lives before the
revolution illustrate firsthand what it meant to be a woman in Iran in the time leading up
to the 1979 fall of the monarchy. She interviews women who were lawyers, students,
business owners, government professionals and housewives. Through their accounts, it is
also clear that women, though having divergent expectations and understandings of the
revolution as it was occurring depending on their class and their social backgrounds, were
present in the coalitions mobilized during the revolutionary moment in 1979.
Anne H. Betteridge describes how “a distinctive feature of the Iranian revolution
was the participation of large groups of women. Western audiences were particularly
impressed by the sight of so many black-veiled women involved in the “referendum of
the streets.”69 Hamideh Sedghi illustrates the political scene during 1979, and the
presence of both the Islamist as well as the secular women on that scene. She writes:
“Homa Nateq, a prominent and progressive historian, hailed Iranian women’s heroic
revolutionary activities, as she spoke to a large crowd at the University of Tehran in early
1979.”70 From her description, it is clear that Iranian women had a significant role during
the protests of 1979. Further, she adds: “Unaccustomed to covering her hair, she wore a
hat-whether concealing her hair signified fear of zealots or political ambivalence is
uncertain.”71

67

ASHRAF & BANUAZIZI, supra note 64.
HALEH ESFANDIARI, RECONSTRUCTED LIVES: WOMEN & IRAN’S ISLAMIC REVOLUTION, (The Woodrow
Wilson Center Press, 1997).
69
ANNE H. BETTERIDGE, TO VEIL OR NOT TO VEIL: A MATTER OF PROTEST OR POLICY, (Guity Nashat ed.,
Women and Revolution in Iran 109, Westview Press, 1983).
70
SEDGHI, supra note 46, at 211.
71
Id.
68

28

Keddie, while describing the secular and guerilla opposition forces during the
revolution, writes that “although women students played and play an important role in
political demonstration and activities, even more numerous in the demonstrations of 1978
were chadored bazaari women, who came out usually in separate ranks to participate in
the mourning processions, where they had always been, but where their presence took on
a new political meaning.”72 These accounts not only show that the Iranian woman was an
integral element of the revolution, but also that the veil in and of itself held significant
symbolic meaning from the early days of the uprising.

C. The Veil as a Symbol
As portrayed in the previous chapter, the 1979 revolution and the unrest beginning in the
Spring of 1977 was a result of various factors that impacted the various actors of
opposition. Analyses of the revolution in Iran attribute the overthrow of the monarchy to
different influences, from the rapidly occurring economic changes and state accumulation
of power and wealth, to socio-political aspects of Iranian life at the time. An article in the
Associated Press from September 4, 1978 stated that
the source of current turmoil is Iran’s rush into the 20th century engineered by the
Shah over the past 15 years. In 1963, a decade after the United States helped him
seize power, he began his effort to bring Iran’s feudalistic society into the modern
world…But modernization has collided with ancient social and religious
traditions, whose proponents refused to budge. 73
The various analyses all have one general concept in common: that a shared
sentiment between all revolutionary forces at the time was one of denouncing, or at the
very least, distrust of imperialism, the association of Western/European models with
modernization and deviation from traditional Persian traditions, culture and lifestyle.
Homa Hoodfar recalls, in a podcast interview with Manijeh Nasrabadi, co-editor of
Jadaliyya’s Iran Page, how in the years prior to the revolution during her visits back
home from where she was studying in Europe, she noticed that her previously seemingly
Westernized friends and colleagues had increasingly began embracing Iranian culture;
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listening to Farsi music, reading Farsi writers, etc.74 This general anti-imperial sentiment
and the cultural wave of returning to Iranian roots are essentially what lies behind the
appearance of the veil in a political context during the revolution: moving beyond its
religious role the veil became a symbol for political dissent to some. Keddie explains this
further by describing that
veiling has become perhaps the central symbol of the Islamic Republic; the veil
and “proper veiling” have become definitional symbols of a woman’s faith and
loyalty. Although in traditional Islamic discourse the veil is related to modesty
and morality, its transformation into a central symbolism of power has imbued it
with a total religiopolitical significance as well.75
Further emphasizing the “political’ rather than merely religious role of the veil is
the fact that secular, non-veiled women in the 1970s, embraced the chador during protests
and modest dress in public spaces as “a sign of opposition to the shah and solidarity with
his popular class opponents.”76 In a different account by Betteridge, she describes the
wearing of the veil as indicating a “particular moral stance---morality defined positively
by Islamic law or negatively by opposition to the immortality of the Shahs’ regime and
the West in general.”77
t was as such that the veil came to hold various significances in the revolutionary
moment, during which wall graffiti and publications depicted the symbol of the veiled
woman. The veil had become so symbolic of revolution and femme-force, that the first
stamp in Iranian history to include a woman was that of a veiled woman issued in the
years of the revolution. It is noteworthy however to read into Sedghi’s description of the
stamp which she illustrates as such:
She [the veiled woman on the stamp] had no body, only a face cloaked in black, a
face without wrinkles or lines, a face with a closed mount and serious eyes
looking into infinity. Except for a gun showing from behind her head, the
background looked cold. There was no feeling, or passion. Only because her hair
was covered. she could not be mistaken for a man. 78
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From her depiction, it is clear that the veiled woman of the revolution; once
carrying the chador on her body as an act of defiance and dissent, would be used by the
new regime to encapsulate the body of the female subject. The regimes change, but the
tactics of the patriarchy remain. The revolutionary regime was quick to redefine the
Iranian woman and her body, where the ideal woman was “a pious Muslim and militant
fighter; more importantly, she was masculinized or perhaps, a de-sexualized woman.”79
This image of the desexualized and covered woman soon became a critical symbol of the
revolution, and later, of the Islamic state. The veil gradually went from being a symbol,
to being institutionalized. But how did this process occur? When did the shift in power of
the veil being an Iranian woman’s personal and/political choice, into an opportunity for
the state to “touch” the very body of the revolutionary woman; restructuring her into a
subject to serve its new ideals and state-building objectives?

D. Khomeini and the Iranian Woman: A Shift in Narrative
The most straight forward way to go about understanding the means in which the state
was able to touch the bodies of women in the 1979 moment is by understanding the
chronology of events in the wake of Khomeini’s control of Iran. Early on in the events
leading up to the final collapse of the Pahlavi regime, Khomeini, who at the time was in
exile in France, had issued statements that were widely distributed amongst protesters.
Those statements were messages of encouragement to the Iranian protestors and
revolutionaries in general, but also frequently made inference to the gendered aspect of
the revolution; giving particular attention to women and their role in perpetuating the
revolution, commending their brave and heroic participation in demonstrations, and
illustrating the belief in equality and social justice for women as being deeply rooted in
Islamic principles. To mobilize women as part of the revolutionary forces, Khomeini
would emphasize the importance of their participation and his commitment to embracing
Islam’s true ideal of the liberation of women. He wrote, from France to Iran: “As for
women, Islam has never been against their freedom. It is, to the contrary, opposed to the
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idea of woman-as-object and it gives her back her dignity. A woman is a man’s equal;
she and he are both free to choose their lives and their occupations.” 80
He juxtaposes this notion of Islamic liberation of women against the, at the time,
ruling Shah’s injustices towards women, which he states were “trying to prevent women
from becoming free by plunging them into immorality. It is against this that Islam rears
up. This regime has destroyed the freedom of women as well as men. Women as well as
men swell the population of Iranian prisons, and this is where freedom is threatened.” 81
While the Shah’s regime had reduced the Iranian female to what many women described
as mindless 82 and sexualized bodies to echo physical reflections of the West and its
modernization model, the Khomeini regime seemed to do the same on a different end of
the spectrum: “the IRI promoted Islamization and anti-Westernization by controlling
women’s bodies and their sexuality as strategically vital to state consolidation of
power.”83 Almost immediately after Khomeini took power, the rapid shift in the discourse
on women is palpable from Khomeini’s statements in public, and the series of legal
changes made as part of the Islamic regime’s first actions in solidifying its power in Iran.
In February 1979, Khomeini officially seized power from the Shah, returning to
Iran. It is important here to note, that Khomeini was not the only popular revolutionary
leader in Iran at the time. Khomeini rose to his position of leadership amongst
progressive leaders like Mehdi Bazargan, Ayatollah Shariatmadari Ayatollah Taleqani
and Shariati as well as many leftist activists from the Mojahedin. 84He was however, as
Keddie describes it, “the most uncompromising opponent of the Pahlavis, of the
monarchy itself, and of foreign control and cultural domination.”85 To understand that
Khomeini did not come to power out of a void, that there was political competition, and
that his more absolutist ideology is essentially what got him into power through popular
support, suggests an explanation as to why in 1979 mechanisms of control were so
prominently exercised.
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In October, 1979 the New York Times published an interview conducted by
Oriana Fallaci a month prior with Imam Khomeini. In the interview, when asked about
the reason behind the enforcement of the hijab/chador, the Imam stated the following:
The women who contributed to the revolution were, and are, women with the
Islamic dress, not elegant women all made up like you, who go around all
uncovered, dragging behind them a tail of men. The coquettes who put on makeup
and go into the street showing off their necks, their hair, their shapes, did not fight
against the Shah. They never did anything good, not those. They do not know
how to be useful, neither socially, nor politically, nor professionally. And this is
so because, by uncovering themselves, they distract men, and upset them. Then
they distract and upset even other. 86
This comes into stark contrast with Khomeini’s earlier statements prior to the collapse of
the regime, which displayed a focus on uniting women under the promise and hope of a
more inclusive and autonomous futures for themselves. Nevertheless, this statement, by
October 1979, had not been born out of a void; rather, since the Islamic Republic’s
conception, its intentions behind the new process of state building and power
consolidation became immediately clear.

E. Life and Law in the Wake of Revolution
Core to the process of state-building is the creation of legal rule and legislative capacities.
In post-revolution societies, this process of creation becomes particularly significant.
Revolutions create particularly volatile situations when the different revolutionary
coalitions and forces compete over the consolidation of power in the momentary absence
of rule of law and an entrenched sovereign. The creation of this rule of law and
legitimization of power through a legal framework that regulates societal relations, then
becomes critical for the continuation of the revolutionary regime in an environment that
could cultivate power asymmetries. Matthew Lange describes this moment of state
vulnerability by writing:
When the state is governed by rules and its relations with society are dictated by
set procedures and laws, the potential for arbitrary action by either state officials
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or societal actors is reduced, opening a space for formal relations between the
two.87
By doing so, the revolutionary regime, especially the one arising from major social
revolutions, succeeds in further rooting the infrastructural capacity and disciplinary
systems of the state onto and into its subjects and society, as it draws on popular
mobilization and the fact that its legitimacy sprouts from the will of the social masses. 88
The case of the Iranian Revolution falls in line with this understanding of postrevolutionary state power accumulation. It was a social revolution, which followed
Weber’s model of state authority building that Jaime Becker and Jack A. Goldstone
describe as being “built on at least three different foundations: charismatic authority,
patrimonial authority (personal authority buttressed by patron/client relationships and
personal rewards that is based on some form of traditional legitimacy), or rationalbureaucratic authority.”89 With Khomeini representing the charismatic authority, it did
not take long for him to enact patrimonial authority as well, based on the traditional
legitimacy of Islam and Shari’a. Khoemini went from capitalizing on his charismatic
authority in the years leading up to the collapse of the Pahlavi regime, to consolidating
that charisma into more tangible structures of authority. In that sense, the Imam and his
revolutionary regime were following Lange’s exact description of state building
methodology post-revolutions, which he describes as follows: “In a revolution, leaders
usually draw initially on charismatic authority, but they realize that for the revolution to
last, they must institutionalize that authority by building new state structures on
patrimonial or rational-bureaucratic lines.”90
In the case of the Islamic Republic, the new state structures that would control
social obedience and the unity of the revolution from disintegrating, were to be built on,
essentially, the judiciary and legislation, whereby, first and foremost in its project of
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Islamicization, the justice system had to institute Islamic law.91 The judiciary was viewed
by the revolutionary regime and its clerical power as the most critical branch of
government, “given that Islam is considered to be an elaborate body of laws in clerical
point of view of Islam.”92 It was on those grounds that the Iranian theocracy was born.
The Islamic Republic’s judiciary initially focused on retaining power during the
instability that follows revolutionary moments, requiring the eradication of the “other” or
the “outsider”93 who could threaten the newly acquired power, while propagating a wellestablished Islamic identity, steadfast in maintaining the anti-imperial sentiments that
drove its rise to power through revolution in the first place. The importance of the
judiciary to the Islamic regime explain why the first official steps taken by Khomeini’s
regime were to institute, amend or abrogate certain laws. The enforcement of the veil on
women, and thus the way in which the Iranian state attempted to manifest its touch on the
bodies of Iranian women every day; on the streets, in the workplace and within the
confines of their private lives, can be seen from the lens of the previously described
method of state-building, whereby state accumulation of unrivaled power in the
revolutionary moment became critical for the creation of the Islamic Republic.
The desire of the state to dress women, was quite literally, their desire to “veil”
the female from the state apparatus; to reduce her visibility and thus subjugate a major
element of dissent. The Iranian female, and all the paradoxical values she had stood for in
the years prior to the foundation of the Islamic Republic, from the years of the Pahlavi
regime; as the symbol for and target of Iran’s Westernization, to the years of the
revolution; as the symbol for liberation of the Iranian identity, was a potential site
through which the new state could be threatened. The female subject, then, had to
contained. Her body, the site of struggle of so many narratives, had to be concealed.
Najmabadi eloquently writes: “In the first months and years following the overthrow of
the Pahlavi dynasty in February 1979, the symbolism crafted in the previous decades
between woman and culture was translated into the most horrific meanings:
"revolutionary purification and cleansing campaigns" targeted dismissal of secular
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women professionals as "remnants of the old regime." Having located the site of "social
sickness" on the bodies of women, eradication of "Westitis'' from Islamo-Iranian culture
translated into repeated waves of attacks against unveiled women and the eventual
imposition of the veil and an elaborate "code of modesty."”94
The laws enforced by Khomeini, in the early days after revolution had succeeded,
thus formed a space through which the Iranian regime could touch, and accordingly
obscure, the bodies of not only the secular, unveiled women, but of the female as a
concept and ground for political struggle. It must be noted here, though, that the laws
Khomeini enacted did not all together, and all at once, strip the Iranian woman of her
presence in its entirety. Khomeini, despite banning women from practicing in the sociopolitical realm, never did ban women from voting. Further, Khomeini never removed
women from his discourse. On the contrary; he had redefined the woman’s role in society
as the “mother”, and the “care-giver.” The woman’s role was to protect the nation’s
morality; the way she carries her body a symbol of moral purity, rather than a force for
revolution. In May 1979, Khomeini stated the following: “Women have the responsibility
of motherhood and raising the children. The mother is the child’s first class, a good
mother is a good class…If you bring up a child correctly, and one day that child is a
leader of society, then the country will be prosperous and yours will be the credit.” 95
Even during the Iran-Iraq war, women’s economic roles were emphasized. Though the
details of these rights go beyond the scope of this thesis, it is important to note that the
discourse around the Iranian woman was formed in a way that would serve the state’s
agenda. In order to do so, the Iranian woman had to become a neutralized subject of the
state, serving only the purposes laid out for her by the regime. For the regime, her
“visibility” and voice needed to be concealed insomuch as it threatened the state’s power.
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F. Laying the Groundwork: Legislation likes build-up, too
Before the law to explicitly veil women came to be, one of Khomeini’s first acts after
taking power of Iran, even prior to establishing a constitution (which would come to be in
December of 1979,) was to abrogate the Family Protection Law of 1967, and to declare it
as un-Islamic. The Family Protection Act was issued as a supplement to the Iranian Civil
Code and the Marriage Act of Iran. Having limited divorce laws and curtailing some of
the freedoms of husband’s in that regard, as well as restricting though not prohibiting
polygamy, and organizing child custody matters in a more formalized manner, the Family
Protection Act had been hailed as advancement towards the protection of women within
the family. An Iranian attorney and activist named Mehrangiz Kar, attributes the abolition
of this act by writing that “the intent of Khomeini’s comments, which were rooted in
radical Islam, was to label all legal measures to improve the status of women during the
shah's regime as contradicting shari’a, rendering these measures ineffective.”96
No more than a week later, Khomeini announced that female judges could not be
appointed in the Iranian judiciary; an interesting decision given the importance and
weight given to the legal branch of government as described above.
In a way, whether intentional or not, it seems like the regime had eased into the
moment of physical touch on the woman, where first her familial status was altered, and
several of her rights even within the sanctity of her home had changed, then her position
in the public sphere and in governance was also curtailed.
These two decisions were shortly followed by Khomeini’s veiling decrees of
March 1979. This was met with strong resistance when woman took to the streets on
International Women’s Day on the 08th of March, 1979. It seemed, at the time, that the
regime had responded to public pressure. 97 Instead of immediately enacting hijab laws,
the regime waited till 1980 when it took the first step to legally stipulating the veil, by
enforcing it in all workplaces. The veil had officially been enforced in the work place
within a year after the post-revolutionary regime had come to power. In the meantime,
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the overall narrative was saturated with cues of tying the Iranian woman to virtue and
morality. Women’s roles were redefined in ways that associated them with the Iranian
nation’s purity and sense of morality and to protect the nation’s purity, the state had to
protect the woman’s purity as well. The regime had rooted itself in its anti-colonial,
traditionalist identity, and the veil had become one of the symbols of the same. It seems,
then, like the most obvious way to go about in “protecting” the nation’s identity of
“purity,” would be through the protection of the veil. And thus, the moment of “touch”
had officially come to be.

G. What’s in a Law?
In the immediate wake of the revolution, in 1982, Islamic criminal law legislations were
stipulated in three bills that were adopted for 5 years. Those three bills laid the
groundwork for the Penal Code, which was officially passed by the parliament in 1991. 98
The laws relevant to the hijab are found in Book 5 of the Penal Code, titled “Ta’azirat.”
Ta’zir is the branch of Islamic Law that deals with punishment for crimes and offenses at
the discretion of the judge or ruler of the state. These are crimes or offenses for which
punishment is not outlined by the Quran or Hadith 99. Particularly, the laws that have been
used to justify punitive measures against Iranian woman for the hijab (or lack thereof) are
governed by articles under Chapter 18, titled “Offenses against Public Moral.” The fact
that the hijab law is placed under this body of law is no coincidence, and the fact that the
chapter is titled as such is strategic; it feeds off of the success of the state in cognitively
associating the Iranian woman with morality and thus allows an umbrella under which
any woman-related questions could fall. Because the Iranian woman is now the
gatekeeper of Iranian public morality; her behavior, and how she carries herself in public
is subjected to legislative scrutiny under this chapter.
Article 638 of Chapter 18 reads: “Anyone who explicitly violates any religious
taboo in public beside being punished for the act should also be imprisoned from ten days
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to two months, or should be flogged (74 lashes).”100 Underneath it lies a note that states
that “women who appear in public without a proper hijab should be imprisoned from ten
days to two months or pay a fine of 50,000 to 500,000 Ryal.” 101 Further, article 639
states the following:
the following people should be imprisoned from one to ten years, and in the case
of category (a) the property should be confiscated according to decision of the
court.
a) anyone who manages a property where activities against public moral
take place;
b) anyone who encourages people to violate public moral.102
In typical law-making manner, the phrasing of both articles is generic by design.
“Any religious taboo” could entail any wide range of behaviors that are deemed as such
by whoever is applying the law. There is no strict definition for what a religious taboo is.
In fact, there is no refence to “taboo” or its Arabic translation in Islamic texts (i.e., Quran
or Hadith.) The fact that something could be considered to be taboo is thus an entirely
man-made concept that is unrelated to the faith itself. The same applies to “violating
public moral.” This is a statement that is so temporal, it becomes illusive. At a time when
a nation had just undergone such major structural change, with so many different
ideologies and cultural differences between the different socio-political classes in Iran, it
is necessary to ask: which public? Whose morals? The Islamists? The working class
Bazaaris? The Western-educated elite? Is public morality so rigidly set-in stone? Does it
not perhaps alter over time and across class? Who’s to speak on behalf of the entire
public and determine that a particular act defies its abstract sense of honor?
The note added to article 638 is the only place where the word hijab, verbatim, is
seen in Iranian legal texts. By including the note, specific scrutiny of women’s dress
becomes legal. By inserting the word “proper,” the law stretches to encompass anything
those applying the law; namely male judges, deem “improper,” which adds on to the
ambiguity of the law, and allows for a wider range of its application There is no
specification of what defines proper veiling. It is even argued that there are no indications
of what veiling really entails In Islamic texts as one can conclude from a quick search
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into Islamic text and hadith with regards to the veil. The references to how or what it
would even mean for a woman to be covered made in the Islamic texts are broad and, in
textual terms, either too context-specific or open for interpretation. There is no strictly
defined method or image of what the hijab would look like. The mainstream view of the
hijab is the result of the inferred requirement for modest dress found in the Qur’an, which
is considered the primary source of all Islamic jurisprudence.103 Lila Abu-Lughod
describes how the veil is considered by today’s educated Muslim women to portray a
sense of virtue, piety and a desire to be close to God, as well as prescribing a sense of
modernity and urban sophistication. 104Some perceive hijab to be limited to modest dress,
some believe it to mean the head-scarf and some perceive it to mean the burqa. There is
no universally accepted form of hijab and wherever you go, different Muslims will tell
you different things about what they believe hijab means.
Article 638 exploits this ambiguity by allowing judges the discretion in
determining whether a hijab is proper or not. Article 639 allows judges the same
authority in defining what constitutes public morale; and what breaches it. These two
laws provide the state with substantial space for maneuvering judicial decisions on the
basis of individual judges’ discretion. While some space is an important aspect for judges
to be able to perform their duties, an essential precondition for such room to be left for a
judge is a legal system premised on sound and fair laws and ideals. If the system is based
on patriarchal notions applied by male dominated apparatuses, such a large space for
judges to conclude rulings independently on the basis of their own whims and according
to their separate discretions has the potential to become the precise platform through
which the state can control the bodies of female Iranians.
No longer only regulating the lives of women in the household and public sphere,
the laws of the new regime had formally touched the very body of the female citizen. By
ordering her to dress in a particular fabric, the state would be policing her body. By
policing her body, the state could control how she used it and to what end; it could weed
out the uncovered, unlawful bodies, silencing them and ensuring that only the obedient
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bodies are allowed to function within their specified domains. However, resilient in the
way that it is, the female body, no stranger to the sensation of the violent touch and tear
of the state, gradually healed and learned new ways to maneuver itself around the
relentless fingers of the state.
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IV. The Fabric of Resistance
Together with his close collaborator Felix Guattari, Deleuze was particularly concerned
with the idea of becoming: those individual and collective struggles to come to terms
with matters of fact, contingencies, and intolerable conditions and to shake loose, to
whatever degree possible, from determinants and definitions— “to grow both young and
old [in them] at once.” In becoming, according to Deleuze, one can achieve an ultimate
existential stage in which life is simply immanent and open to new relations,
camaraderies and trajectories without predetermined telos or outcome.
-Biehl and Locke105

Becoming as an act of resistance through collective struggle is the best way to
describe the feminist movement in Iran. Here, I use “feminist movement” not necessarily
to describe a specific entity or movement, rather to address the resistance of all women in
Iran, regardless of their formal political affiliations or lack thereof. Every act to defy the
oppressive order of things; every creative way in which the system was maneuvered by
women, every advancement for women’s rights in Iranian public and private life; they are
all manifestations of the feminist movement to which I refer here. The Iranian woman,
since the revolution of 1979 in specific, has been both a subject onto which constant
power struggles have reflected, but has also been herself an object of constant resistance.
An historical anecdote of Women’s Day of 1979 in Tehran puts this in
perspective. On March 6th, 1979 Khomeini announces that women must wear the veil,
“the hijab” being his choice of words, in the workplace. On March 8th, 1979, women in
the thousands take to the streets to protest Khoemini’s statements on the enforcement of
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the hijab.106 In the days after the first step to veil women from public life, both
physically and figuratively, women took to the streets in the first of its kind women’s
march, responding to the attempts to conceal them and make them “less visible” by being
as visible as they could be. Rebecca Gould encapsulates this poetic and yet very political
act of reversal and resistance: “They have reinscribed the veil’s meanings by using it to
give themselves greater, rather than less, visibility, and by politicizing its significations.
Such re-inscriptions illustrate how the meanings of the hijab are as variable and
variegated as is the cloth from which it is woven.” 107
In this chapter, I build on the story of the Women’s March of March 8th, Biehl and
Locke’s concept of resistance, and on Hoodfar’s eloquently formulated argument that
“while veiling has been used and enforced by the state and by men as means of regulating
and controlling women's lives, women have used the same institution to loosen the bonds
of patriarchy imposed on them.”108 By looking into the Iranian women’s movement and
its experience in rallying for women’s rights since 1979 under the Islamic Republic’s
newly formed systems of subjugation, one can watch the unravelling of the fascinating
story of the resilience of the woman in her fight against the patriarchy and its continuous
attempt to shackle her body down. To illustrate this story, I continue using the hijab law
to exemplify the state’s capacity to legally touch the bodies of women. I specifically look
into the evolution of women’s agency in Iran since (and in spite of) the hijab law, and the
ways in which Iranian women have manipulated and worked around it to rally for more
rights in the public and private life, rather than succumb to the “invisibility” intended by
its creators. I present the dichotomy at every stage of the Iranian regime’s attempts to
physically and figuratively veil the woman from public life. First, I explore the violent
methods with which the state administered the hijab law, and the following response in
women’s continued resistance. Then, I look into the many ways in which Iranian women
were able to increase their visibility in public life (from politics to education to the labor
market) since 1979, despite the regime’s strict intent on veiling them from it. Finally, I
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reflect on the implications that the case of Iran and its use of the hijab law has on my own
understanding of law, its purpose and its potential.

A. The Birth of a New Iranian Feminism
The post-revolutionary regime in Iran, particularly in its earliest months, rolled back
several rights women were previously able to enjoy. Within the first weeks of Khomeini
taking power, the Family Protection Law of 1967 is abrogated. On the 3rd of March,
1979, he announces that women can no longer be judges in courts of law and on the 6 th of
March 1979, he announces that women must wear the hijab in the work place109; the first
step in the gradual process leading to the official legal enforcement of the veil in Iran in
1983. Even a simple survey of the earliest statements and government decisions would
illustrate the generally limiting context created for Iranian women in post-revolutionary
Iran. Interestingly, though, the ability of women to rally for their rights and, in many
ways, lobby for more access to public goods like education and health care, was also
increasing. This paradoxical situation was created first and foremost, ironically enough,
because of the Islamic Republic’s focus on gender and women’s issues, thus, allowing for
a space in which women, as a separate entity from the rest of the population, were
targeted and consequently were able to speak out against that very targeting.
Additionally, the fact that the Islamic Republic was a newly founded system that still
needed to establish its capacity as an independent state arising from a revolutionary
moment and thus needed to build and maintain legitimacy, meant that it also needed to
uphold popular support. The post-revolutionary state could not afford to lose the support
of the masses, including its female subjects. By capitalizing on their political power
which, in and of itself, helped in the fall of the Iranian monarchy and thus the creation of
the Islamic Republic, and the fact that the regime needed their support, women were able
to utilize this political space to push back against the curtailing of their rights. As Louise
Halper writes, “despite adopting a variety of retrograde gender policies, the post-
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revolutionary government also encouraged women to be politically active and in return
was required to respond to the demands that women’s activism produced.” 110
It is within this enigmatic socio-political setting that the Iranian Women’s
movement operated and was able to make large strides towards an increasingly vocal
resistance for the Iranian female. The hijab law was an act by the Iranian state to
disseminate revolutionary forces, and in particular, to control the female subject in state
and society. Interestingly, the very same law became, in and of itself, an opportunity for
women to access certain rights and liberties that may not have been possible earlier.
“Through the dress code, the state endeavors to define and symbolically control the role
of women. By flaunting the dress code, women not only seek to score points against the
authorities; they also strive to assert autonomy over their own persons,”111 writes
Esfandiari as they encapsulate the catch-22 the Iranian regime found itself in by drawing
particular weight on the way Iranian women dress. “The dress code has become a
principal battleground between the state and women, and the battle over dress assumed
political significance,”112 Esfandiari further claims. The fact that the word “battleground”
is used as an anecdote for the socio-political importance the veil had in postrevolutionary Iran is an interesting, and quite accurate term that is reminiscent of Azar
Nafisi’s account as she tried to illustrate the lives of her female students 18 years after the
revolution. Nafisi writes: “In the course of nearly two decades, the streets have been
turned into a war zone, where young women who disobey the rules are hurled into patrol
cars, taken to jail, flogged, fined, forced to wash the toilets and humiliated…” 113

B. Violence Vs. Fashion
In the previous chapter, I explained how the Iranian regime was able to touch the bodies
of its female citizens through the power of legislation. In reality, the violence did not end
with laws on paper. Those laws were diligently applied immediately after their
promulgation, and the violence that was propagated through the law, was now upheld by
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the state’s institutions. By establishing special policing units, the regime had transformed
its ‘poetic’ approach of touching Iranian women’s bodies into a very real, very tactile
approach of touch. Aretxaga describes that the sovereign enacts mechanisms as such
through the law to uphold its power. He writes that “the ghostly, persecutory power of
law is incarnated in the police, a haunting figure invested with formless power (Benjamin
1978), whose effects are seen as disappearances, corpses, arrests, and internments but
whose identity remains mysterious, as objects of constant speculation, rumor, and
fear.”114The state was exercising its tactics of control by using its own apparatus to quite
literally touch the female body into subservience. This could be seen, once again, as an
indication of the failure of the Iranian state’s biopolitical project, wherein the state could
not move past the point of control mechanisms, to truly create disciplined bodies.
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC,) called Sepah-e Pasdaran-eEnqelab-e Eslami in Farsi, was born out of the revolution in an attempt by Khomeini to
safeguard the post-revolution regime. By bringing together various Islamic militant
groups and recruiting young volunteers, the IRGC shared in the Iranian military’s
sovereignty over air and sea warfare, and even surpassed it in political importance when
it became the “source of the clerical regime’s power both domestically and
internationally.”115
The IRGC is divided into different branches to serve different purposes, but the
“Basij” is one of its major forces, and, for me, the most interesting. Formed in 1980, and
tasked with riot control and maintaining internal security, the Basij is considered the
Republic’s moral police. To become the moral police, the Basij members are trained on
things like warfare techniques and internal security; trainings that seem disproportionate
to the potential harm of abstract immorality.116
In addition to the Basij, Khomeini had also formed a Morality Bureau, which was
formed of committees of young armed revolutionary volunteers who would enforce
moral control over their neighborhoods and confront moral crimes and immoral
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behavior.117 In many ways, the two entities; the Basij and the Islamic Revolutionary
Committees, became the regime’s hand with which it touched the bodies of its subjects
and through which the state could extend its gaze onto women’s bodies.
In the years that follow, brute force in implementing dress codes (among other
things that could be classified as belonging to the vague realm of morality) continues to
be a core characteristic of the Iranian regime. The roles of Committees and the Basij
would fluctuate between patrolling, and direct policing. At some point during the 90s, the
Basij’s jurisdiction went from serving as support for the police-force, to gaining the legal
right to act directly alongside the police. The Judicial Support for the Basij Act, had
officially given militiamen the jurisdiction to enforce law. The law reads as follows:
The Basij Resistance Force, . . . like other judicial officers, has permission to take
necessary actions whenever a crime is observed [jorm-e mashhood] and the police
are absent, or when the police are not responding fast enough, or when the police
ask for their help. In these situations, Basiji have to prevent the disappearance of
the criminal evidence, and the flight of the accused, and prepare and send a report
to the judicial authorities. 118
By looking at the sheer numbers of the Basij officers (estimated to be at around 5
million, but officially stated as being up to 22 million) and the structure that disseminates
those officers into every aspect of social and public life in Iran, the extent of the regime’s
efforts in maintaining a presence on the streets to actively police Iranian bodies is clear.
Homa Hoodfar and Ana Ghoreishian explain the role of the morality police by describing
that
since its inception the morality police forces (and the pro-regime vigilantes) have
rigorously policed not only veiling but also the presence of women in public.
They have continually disrupted the lives of millions in their attempt to limit
women’s presence to spaces that the regime deems legitimate, such as hospitals,
mosques and pro-regime demonstrations.119
Monitoring the compliance of women with the government-sanctioned dress code,
since the announcement of Khomeini in the early months following the revolution, has
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been a critical function of the Iranian police force. Ashraf Zahedi puts this in context by
providing a few figures from the early 2000s:
According to Tehran police chief Brigadier General Morteza Talaie, “30 percent
of complaints to police involve cases of women not covering up properly....” In
just one week in August 2004, 200 women were arrested in Tehran, 183 were
arrested in the northern province of Gilan, and 1,250 women received verbal
warnings. This data is for only two of Iran’s 28 provinces. The crackdown on
women has intensified with the new campaign for Amneeyat-e Akhlaghi (Moral
Security) which began on April 21, 2007. In the first three weeks of the campaign,
17,135 women received a verbal warning from the police; others were fined or
sent to jail.120
The state’s violence towards women is, at this point, not merely a symbolic kind
of violence, rather, it has become an intentional and systemic form of violence that is
aimed at ensuring the uniformity and subversion of the masses at large and of women in
particular by subjecting them to the state’s policing gaze; a kind of violence that uses
state institutions for the muscle and legislation for the brains. A kind of violence that is
born out of the complete failure of a state’s biopolitical project.
The most obvious form of resistance by Iranian women, in direct response to the
state’s fixation on women’s dress, has been what Shirin Abdmolaei refers to as
“Refashioning.”121 Alternative dress is the technique scholars refer to when addressing
Iranian women’s choices of dress that contravene the state-approved dress codes of the
chador or the hijab. By politicizing their own bodies, women resist the regime’s agenda
to turn those very bodies into docile, uniform subjects of the state. The Republic aims to
“void the individual person and prevent an assertion of independent bodies,” 122 and in
order to counter that, many women have, in a sense, reclaimed their ownership of their
bodies by dressing them in ways that defy the regime’s orders. Whether it is by dressing
in color, wearing make-up, styling their hijab, or all together discarding it, the act of
embracing independent fashion is considered to be an act of resistance by women in Iran.
Women use the very bodies that were conditioned by the state to become mere vessels for
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morality, and to denounce those ideas, reclaim their sexuality and become, instead,
dissenting bodies defying the state.

C. The Woman’s Place is in the Public
Both the state’s violence and its increased fixation on women’s dress were met with
increased resistance and the counter-effect of providing women with more presence in the
public space. Because of its state sanctioned violence against them, the regime has
created the need for an increased political presence and for more pathways to resistance,
by the masses of women in Iran, through both official channels and women’s movements
as well as decentralized resistance from individual women collectively coming together.
As Hoodfar explains, women in Iran
have understood that visibility is power. Given the extremely repressive nature of
the regime, which precludes the formation of oppositional organizations, women
have engaged in ‘non-organized’ movements, where large numbers of individuals
and small groups engage in common actions in a decentralized manner. These
include small acts of resistance in their daily lives. The extent of these actions has
often resulted in compromises by the regime, and also created shifts in public
opinion...123
By politicizing the personal and turning the private into the legal; even the women
who consider themselves to be non-political become political, whereby the simplest and
most private actions came to be considered acts of political resistance. Shadi Sadr writes
By focusing on veiling as a step towards building a gender-segregated (if not
gender apartheid) society, the state has opened unconventional political pathways
for women, whose scarves, attire and lipstick have become political tools
(Mahmoudi 2000: 84). The fact that the state frequently launches new initiatives
to improve the observance of hijab is an indication of its failure to do so despite
three decades of forceful imposition of the law. 124
It is as such that the hijab law in and of itself cultivated the space for a stronger
and more active women’s resistance movement than ever before in Iranian history. The
hijab law, introduced into a society where women’s revolutionary voices had just been
realized as true political forces, created a ripple effect for the advancement of women’s
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rights in Iran, expanding beyond the confines of fabric, and the freedom to dress or
undress. The hijab law was manipulated by the women of Iran from its primary role as
intended by the state, to control the bodies of its female subjects, to allow for the
opposite: increased mobilization of women in the very public spaces of education and
labor. The bonds tying women down loosened when an increased attention to female
bodies and questions of what women wore and how they dressed became legal questions
and central to state discourse. This, ultimately, legitimized female presence in public and
allowed for the creation of a collective agency, whereas before the revolution, women did
not necessarily see themselves as a separate entity within society. Before the new Iranian
regime was established and before the revolutionary moment, women did not constitute a
singular collective in Iranian society, rather, they were separated by, most prominently,
class. After the revolution, however, women of all classes found their common voice,
making way for an intersectional feminist movement in Iran. As Esfandiari describes,
many professional and better-off women had come to take for granted the rights
and opportunities afforded them before the revolution. For working-class and
lower-middle-class women, the Family Protection Law, day-care centers, and
family planning programs were of much greater moment and provided a greater
sense of security. Today, the necessity for legal protections and rights is felt by
women across the social spectrum. 125
The Islamic Republic’s newly sanctioned dress codes and restrictions created
environments in which public spaces became more accessible for women than before,
particularly women from more conservative economic and social backgrounds. Halper
explains an example of the counter-opportunities which were created by the hijab law,
when it comes to specific groups of women accessing education in particular. Whereas
prior to the veiling law, such access was not feasible owing to their families who
“previously resisted women’s education and employment because they took place within
a “corrupt” public space,”126 the post-revolutionary regime and its fixation on “morality”
and moral dress codes embodied by the hijab, “constructed public space as morally “safe”
for women. The religious state power came to be seen as the guarantor of correct social
behavior of men and women in non-familial settings like the workplace or university.
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Hence, for many traditional families, sending girls to school became much more
acceptable.”127

D. Educa-SHE-on
Education was an essential step for the women’s movement in Iran. By increasing the
access of women across the socio-economic spectrum to education, the resistance
ultimately grew stronger, as access to labor and active political lives sprout from
education. As Akbar Aghajanian wrote “education is also important as it determines other
dimensions of the status of women such a paid labor force participation and health status
of women and female children.”128 From the 1986 census, one can see that by 1986 the
Female Literacy rate had gone from being 35.5% in 1976 to 51.6%.129 Seven years into
the Islamic Republic’s rule, Patricia J. Higgins and Pirouz Shoar-Ghaffari observed that
“the data currently at our disposal suggest that rather than experiencing decreased access
to education, women in less developed, more ethnic, and rural regions of the country
have greater access to at least elementary education in 1986 than they did in 1976.” 130
This increase happened despite the regime’s earlier efforts to segregate women from the
educational institution, with restrictions on what women were allowed to study, when
some subjects were barred to their access like Political Science, Law, Management,
Engineering and others131, (these restrictions were later lifted owing to a campaign by
Zahra Rahnavard in the late 1980s,) 132 as well as the dismissal of many female faculty
members who did not abide by the hijab dress codes. 133 These statistics that so starkly
contradicted “the government's discouragement and even outlawing of women's higher
education in some subjects and employment in several spheres,” 134 lead to the creation of
educated women who “became more publicly active than ever before, and many went to
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court to defend their marital, custodial and economic rights.” 135 As such, and in an
interesting turn of events, with the hijab law in place, more women were able to access
education, and thus, became more aware of their own potential and ability to mobilize to
increase their autonomy and influence.

E. Working Class (S)heroes
In addition to the fact that the hijab law and the discourse it created in and of itself
lead to more accessible public spaces which women were increasingly able to navigate,
the Iran-Iraq war that erupted within the regime’s first year of being allowed for an even
more inclusive public space for women and thus, added fuel to the women’s movement
and their resistance to the state. Breaking in 1980 and running till 1988, the war against
Iraq meant that the Iranian state needed to change many of its initially divisive policies.
The years of the war saw many changes that became favorable for women, from changes
in custody laws, stipulating that custody of children of martyrs belongs to the surviving
parent, regardless of gender 136, to a conversion in public narrative with regards to
women’s roles in society. Most significantly, though, was the change in women’s labor
during the wartime years. The state increasingly encouraged women to enter in the labor
market, in order to make up for the detrimental economic losses it was incurring as a
result of the war. Again, such changes in discourse came in stark contradiction to the
state’s earlier divisive policies, where women were forced to wear the hijab in the
workplace in order to somehow regulate the female body in the labor market, and where a
ban on female judges came within months of the Islamic Republic’s rule.
“Labor market statistics indicate that, contrary to the general expectation of
scholars, the general public, and the Islamic state itself, the rate of female employment in
the formal sector has continued to increase in the 1980s even during the economic slump
and increased general unemployment,”137 writes Hoodfar. With an increase in women
who had to work outside the home, either to make up for the fact that their husbands were
at the frontlines, or because of the difficult economic conditions that required families to
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have two incomes, women were encouraged to participate in the labor force to help
support their families and the Iranian economy. 138 The increased need for the economic
participation of women allowed them to further navigate the public spaces the state had
wanted to veil them from. Roksana Bahramitash illustrates this point when discussing the
ability of women volunteers in national campaigns required by the Khomeini’s counterpoverty efforts, and the same could be said of the women entering into the labor market
in general. Bahramitash writes: “since these organizations brought many women into the
public domain, they effectively counteracted the earlier exclusion of women. In return for
their role as volunteers, women consolidated their public presence in Iran’s postrevolutionary environment.”139 As Monir, one of the women in ‘Reconstructed Lives’
describes, “the greatest resistance by women was their continued presence in their places
of work.”140

F. Bad Laws, Big Potential
In the post-revolutionary moment in Iran, women were confined by the hijab law,
which was intended to control female bodies in the public space. Despite the violence
through which the state attempted to achieve this goal, both circumstance and
mobilization allowed women to resist the oppression intended by the regime, from the
earliest moments of on the 8th of March, 1979 with the largest women’s march to have
been organized at the time in response to the mandatory dress code imposed, to this very
day, women in Iran resist. Their resistance manifests itself in the very personal choices of
how they dress their bodies, by making that personal choice a political one, as was seen
in December 2017 by Vida Movahedi who stood in silent protest by removing her veil,
which then snowballed into a civil disobedience movement named “The Girls of
Revolution Street,” or, as illustrated by this chapter, by navigating the very same public
spaces from which the state’s hijab law so violently attempts to remove them.
As such, the case of Iran raises many questions about the function and nature of
law as we know it. By looking at the post-revolutionary moment in which the Iranian
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regime was able to control the bodies of its citizens in general, and the bodies of Iranian
women in specific, one thing is clear: the state used the law every step of the way. How,
then, do we make sense of the underlying premise of modernity that the law is “good”
and “pure” and “just”? The way in which the Iranian Republic has been able to utilize the
law to advance its interests and eliminate (or attempt to) potential threat of its hegemony
is testament to the fact that law, at the end of the day, is simply just another political tool.
We can see this political nature of law all over the world and across history: the law
endorsed American slavery; the law paved the way for South African apartheid; the law
allows Israel to exist; the law bans women in France from dressing a certain way; the law
dismisses the killing of women if done in the name of Egyptian men’s honor; the law
depletes the Earth and its most vulnerable people to serve Big Corporate.
In challenging the idea of the law’s impartial normativity, Koskenniemi highlights
the idea that the law is indeed political:“According to the requirement of normativity, law
should be applied regardless of the political preferences of legal subjects. In particular, it
should be applicable even against a state which opposes its application to itself.” 141
Though he discusses his theories with regards to international law, the concepts he
presents are also relevant to domestic law. Koskenniemi writes: “Any legal rule, principle
or world order project will only seem acceptable when stated in an abstract and formal
fashion. When it is applied, it will have overruled some interpretation, some collective
experience and appear apologist.”142 I would argue though, that many laws only seem
acceptable to the ones who lay them, and it is so because they actively seek to
marginalize the subjects of those laws and that even without application, they exist in
order to overrule the interpretations and collective experiences of those very subjects.
Law does not come out of a void; it is a meticulous process that has lasting effects on
what Foucault and Deleuze would call “control society.” 143 It is, again as Foucault
describes it, an institution, that helps to reinforce and emphasize power structures and
regulates the dynamic of other disciplinary institutions.144 In many ways, the law is a
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mere reflection of existing power in society; it is not pure or sacred or indicative of a
sacred will of any kind even when it is deemed to be “Islamic” or holy. Pierre Schlag
emphasizes this idea when he writes: “Indeed, the social identities and relations that are
in place-materially and socially-are effectively the handles through which law is imposed
on and insinuated in the social fabric.”145
Following the revolution, the Islamic Republic of Iran used the law as a tool to
subjugate and subvert its people. The hijab law was one such example that was created
for the deliberate subversion of Iranian women. But it does not always have to be so
bleak; the Iranian feminist movement shows us that in the face of state-backed violence,
ambiguous laws that work to oppress, and alienation from public spaces, a multitude of
creative ways for resisting can be born. Carol Smart discusses the importance of
exploiting non-legal strategies to challenge law 146, and I believe that Iranian women show
us every day just how that could be done.
“Rather than the structure or fabric which constitutes our society, the law is a
machine which oils the structures of domination, or which, at best achieves a tinkering on
the side of justice.”147 When we see the law as such, it becomes easy to imagine the
potential of those systemically abused by it in smashing that machine and tearing it apart;
one cog and hair strand at a time.
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V. Conclusion
Iran’s Hijab law tells a story of how states can touch and define the bodies of its subjects.
It tells a story of discourse, power, revolution, violence, but above all, of resistance. I
hope that by understanding the contexts in which the law was crafted, and by presenting
the state’s intentions in creating a law like that, we can inch closer to understanding the
forces at play in the creation of the realities around us, in order for us to address them and
to counter them with the appropriate measures. By understanding the ways in which the
state exploits the law to control our bodies, we can become cognizant of one of the power
dynamics at play in the world around us. By understanding that the real threat to being a
woman is not her choice to dress in one way or another, but rather, is the state’s
institutionalization of law to force a woman to dress in one way or another, we can begin
to look at what truly needs to be challenged: Faulty Legal Systems. In the words of
Simone de Beauvoir, "it is in the knowledge of the genuine conditions of our lives that
we must draw our strength to live and our reasons for acting." 148
The world is a scary place for our bodies. They are raped, and caged, and torn
apart. We are reminded at every step of our lives that our bodies are not our own: they
belong to our husbands, to our fathers, to our children, to the protection of our nations’
honor, to the continuity of human life, to the divine; but never to us. And though that is a
scary and overwhelming thought, it is one that is filled with potential: in a world where
we are robbed of the ownership of our own bodies; reclaiming them as such becomes the
greatest act of resistance.
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